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C H A P T V IH
OF

R E C hI V E R S

I.

- E ij E P A L L Y'.

A receiver, in the legal acceptation of the term,
may be defined as"an indifferent person betv ren the
parties to a cause, appointed by the court to receive
the property or fund in

and preserie
donte lite,

pen-

litigation

when it does not seem reasonable

to the

court that either party should lold 1ts" (1)
The appointment of a receiver pendente lite is
one of the oldest, arid han always been regarded as one
of tie most salutary and effective remedial agencies of
which the court of equity has taken cognizance.

Tihe

origin of this equitable re'riedy is involved in doubt;
but germs of the present system are founrd to have existed at a period almost as remote as the rise of equity as a seperate jurisenrudence.
tion of equity,

Vinlle the jurisdic-

to thus Interfereby the appointment

of a receiver, has been long recognized; courts of equ-

(1) High on Receivers,

Booth

v

Clark,

Sec.

17

1 ;

How. (U.S.) 322.

ty have uniformly procee',ed with great caution in

the

exercise of this moot extraordinary power.
Formerly a receiver would only be appointed upon special gro'unds
In

justifying ouch an interference,

the nature of a bill

was probably borrowed

quasi

timet, w!ich procedure

Within more recent per-

-ncient conmmon law writs.(1)
iods,

of some of' the

from the title

confined

we find the appoinment of a receiver

almost exclusively to cases arising out of litigation
in

the form

of a creditor's

these restrictions,

bill.

But in

the jurisdiction of the court of

b een
equity has gradually and surely extended,
present time it

spite of

until

at the

embraces almost every class of subject

matter over which litigation

can arise or

the claims

of sultors attach.
This extention was brought about in
largely,

Ligland,

by the judicature act of 183 whIch provided:

that the power

to appoint a receiver should be extended

to all caoeo where it should appear to the court to

(1)

JI,

Story's Equity Jurloprudence,

Sec.

E25.

be just and convenient; and ouch application might be
made unconditionally,

or upon ouch terms and condltlona

as the c-urt might think just.
have been brought about in

thl

(1)

Slmllar changes

courntry,

partly by

legislatlve enactment and partly by judicial decisions.
Not only has

the subject matter,

recelver may be appointed,

it

ov( r which a

been greatly extended; but

has also become customary to cloth receivers with

much greater powers than were formerly conferred upon
But while the rules of practice and procedure

them.

have thus been changed

from time to time; the funda-

mental principles which govern

their appointment,

de-

remain

termilne their powers and fix their liabilities,
substaritially the same.
It

is

not my purpose to attempt to trace the his-

tory of thi8 branch of equity jurisprudence;

kut rather

to give as near as may be the practice and Drocedure
which are necessarily involved1

in

the appointment of

receiver,

and some of the principal powers and

(1)

B

Par.

Sec.

25.

liabil-

itie

which attach to that officer.

these polnto,.I

endeavor

8hall

In diocussing

to follow the rulen of

practice and procedure an recogized and enforced by
courts of equity in

t hin country at the precent time,

with secial reference

to the old chancery practice of

New Yor'k.which has been very largely followed by most
of the otateo of thls co-untry.

II.

C H A P T E i

O.F

APPOJINTMEhT

A

REGEIVER

General Principles governing the Appointment
As a general rule, the court will not grant an
application for the appointment of a receiver, save in
e.ceptional cases,

as in the case of an infant or

a suit is actually pending. (1)

atic, unles

lun-

In any

cace the primary object sought to be attained by the
appointment of a receiver Is to save In tact and undiminished, as far as possible, the subject matter in
controversy, for the benefit of those who are found to
be equitably entitled.

Hence It follows that ",the

power to appoint a receiver is most usually called into
action, either to prevnt fraud, save the subject of
litigation from material injury, or rescue It from
threatened destruction."

(2)

In general the party making the application for

(1) Jones
(2) Baker

v
v

Schall, 45 Mlch. 379.
Administrators of Backus, 32

Ill.

79.

a receiver must show to the satisfaction of the court,
that he has some clear right or interest In the property In controversy, and unle.ss relief is grantel, he
will

suffer irreparable injury,

through the ne-lect,

misconduct or Insolvency of' the defencdant.

The application for a receiver Is
ed to the sound dlocretlon o
the extent of such discretion,

alwuats addresr-

the court;(1) but as to
there has been nome

difference of opinion; some courts holdin,; that the
power to appoint a receiver Is a matter of arbitrary
discretion on the part of the court, and when once male
cannot be Interferred with on appeal. (2)

The better

and more generally accepted rule 18 thus stated by
Miller. J.0"while the litigation is pending and involves questions of title, fraud and the like, the appointment and discharge of a receiver is purely discretionary and wihin the

sole power of the court

; but where

these questions hat.s been pasred upon, and there Is a
definite and fixed right and a clear titlethe appoint-

----------------------------------------------------Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 881.
(1) II
1 Hop. Ch. 485.
(2) WI lson v Denis,

ment or discharge 18 not discretionary,
within the power of the court

and it

to with hold it.

The controllng elemento which determine

is not
(1)
the ad-

visability of appolntlnir a receiver are the nuture and
condition of the subject matter,
parties,

the peculiar

the relation

facts and circumstances3

of the
attending

each case and the probability of the plaintiff being
Like most equitable

untimately entitled to a decree.

remedies the underlylng principles whici justify
court of equity in

render

and the inability of the law to

sought.

the relief

Courts

the pos8iblllty of

interferingare

irreparable mischief

the

(2)

exercising Jurisdiction.

The appointment of' a receiver is strictly an
original process and is exercised almost exclusively
by courts having equity power.
seperate chancery sysjtem,
er is generally
(!) MLt
(7)

r

In

the power

states having a
to appoint a receiv-

limited to these tribunals; but in
TwiJ r.Cout.r
F..

2-L
\Th
Ai)' 1.

F

receiver
overaing the appointment of
73;f5,
lonrop, 11 iUd. Ch.
v
.ee Blondliei
See also valuable note 64 Am_. Dec. 4d2-95.

1or r1L1QS

those

HtaUtea

e
booti

1eulole.

ro)po~r 1

t

where
,

LI I

the Gy,; tem of e(luity uiid law iV-ve
court of or Igir 10

ju1

I

(It", 1 r(4
cl

such appointment.

In states which have adopted codeo of procedure,
the courts which may appoint a receiver are usually
determined by special statutory provisions.

In New

York the supreme court, the superior, city or county
courts may appoint a receiver in cases specified in
section

i13 of the code of civil procedure.
As a general rule the court first acquiring

jurisdiction will retain jurisdiction till the end of
litigation;and this rule is equally applicable to state
and federal courts as well as courts of co-ordinate
jurisdiction. (1)
Strictly speaking, a court cannot appoint a receiver over subject matter not within ltw- jurisdiction,
but departures from this rule are frequently made,
owing to considerations of comity which exists between
diffenent courts.

(2)

(1) 7 Chicago Legal News, 38.
(2) Taylor v Insurance Co., 14 Allen
See post page 47 and cases cited.

353;

Over what Subject Matter a Receiver may be appointed.

In

Creditors bill:equity,

no class

of cases hao the aid of

by the appointment of a receiver,

frequently invoked

than In

creditors suits.

property of the debtc r equitably belongs
!tor;

and it

is

property during
appointed In

The

to the cred-

to prevent a disposition of the debtors
the litigation,

that a receiver

is

this class of cases.

1he right of the creditors
fund in

been more

to the property or

question having been ascertained,

proceed to distribute

the court will

the same among them,

according

to the extent of their res3pective interests.
The former -New York practice was to appoint a
receiver In
tnsatisfled,

creditors suits after return of execution
almost as a matter of course.

(1)

Thla

procedure has been practically superseded by supplementary proceedings under the code, which are more
expeditious and equally available.
DlIssolutlon of a partnership:-

Here a receiver will

----------------------------------------------------

(1)

Fitzburg

v

Everingham,

6

Paigeo Ch.

29.

10

upon

be appointed

the

applicatilon of' any interented

hut a receiver will not ordinarily be ap-

party. (1)

pointed to carry on partnership buslness,1"nor will a
dissolution be ,tllowed unless

the company is insol-

vent or fraud is shown or some other good ground
(2)

exi s ts. "

A receiver will only be ap-

Mortgage foreclosure:-

vointed in this class of cases, when it can be shown
that the mortgage premisres are insufficient security
for the satisfaction of the debt,
personally liable for
Corporations:-

enters with extreme

power,

reluctance

to managce through a receiver,

complicatei affairs of a corporation.
a leading ELglloh case,

(4)

210.
Ch.
Ford, 2 Palges
v VanSchalk, 4 Palgeo Ch.

(a) Warner

v

Goveneur,

1 1B3arb.

the

It han been

that a receiver-

Law v
(1)
(2) Martin

(4)

absence of

In

cases of absolute necessity Into the ex-

ercise of its

held in

(3)

the debt is Insolvnt.

The court of equity,

statutory provisions,
and only in

and that the party

479.

568;

4U8
Haas etal, v Chicago Building Society 89 Ill.
89'
Eq.
N.J.
11
Hathaway,
But see Gorblegen v
the leading N1\ew Jersey case upon this point.
Loiidon Chathan Andover R.R.Co.
v
Gardner
201.
2 Law heport8 (Ch. Div.)

should not be appoIntel except in the course of proceedings, in which the result of the

ecree would be

a virtual dissolution of the corporation.
ropmer equity practice, simple miscon'luct
on the part of some or

Under the
or bad faith

1l1 of the trustees or officers,

would not constitute sufficient ground for the appointment of a receiver.
Put all
enactment In

this has been changed by le7illitlve
nearly every -,tate, and in

some vtotes

the opposite extreme seems to have been reached.
Permanent receivers are appointed who are empowerel
to take the property out of the hands of the corporate
managers, and to carry on the business of the corpor-

ation,

in connebtion with the court,

issue receivers

certificates, which take priority over antecedent liens
and are otherwl;e clothed with extensive and dangerous
p O!; e r8.
"More than two-thirds of the great railroad corporations of our country have at some time during their

existence, been under the control of a receiver."

TM

condition of affairs has been brou;ht about lar <elj,
by the increasing tendency of the courts,

to allow a

receiver to take poceseion of the corportite property
ani

conduct ito bulnems,

In

cuses of' financial em-

barrasoment only.
The exercle of thing

re'tt liberality has not

always been conducive to the bn:t int ..:T(tf
!-orate creditore; and rnny protet

of cot-

by e.inent author-

itles have been made agaiinst any further extentloa In
this direction. (1)
Thle extraordinary pov-er should only be called
into activity, when It is

indispensably necessary to

protect sore clear right, which would otherwise be let,
or ireatly enrlani{ore,

and which cannot be saved or

protected in any other way.

This rule should be equal-

ly applicable to every class of subject matter over
which courts of equity can exercise jurisdiction.
Joint Stock Assoclations:-

The rules governing the am

(1) 'ee diseentlng opinion by Mller J.
Barbour
14 Otto (U.S. ) 126.
)ee also 21 Am. Law Review, 141.

in Earton

v

13

polntrment of a receiver In

cacoes effecting

the aver-

age joint stock arn-ocizition are practically the same
an those In partnership cases; but If
association has been Incorporated,
powers and liabillties of

the joint -tock

and has assumedt the

c,orportlon pr(,

rthen,.

the rules of appoInment will conform more nearly to
those existing In

the case of a corporation.

In an action foi specific performance:may be appointed in

A receiver

this clasc of actions when it

fap-

pears that the purchaser can be compelled to execute
h is

contract, and that the circumstances

render such an appointment necesary.
In an action for a divorce:-

of the case

(1)

A receiver may in cer-

tain cases be appointed over the property of the hu8band,

to enable the court to apply so much of' the prop-

erty as may be necesFary to the suinort of the defendant during, the lltlgcitlon.
In

(2)

case of executors and administrators:-

will be appointed in
(1) B~oehia
(2) Kirby

v
v

this clt:s.

A receiver

of cases when it

,-Tood,
20 \!all.
(U.S.)
60.
Kirby, 1 Paiqen Ch.
261.

can

be cleirly

that the,-e In eminent dan'ier of their

;hovrii

waoting or mrnapplying
the trust

or that a portion of

fund will be loot through their misconduct

or n-,lgI.-ence.

(1)

ctu. e of truoteeo:-

In

the aaoets,

to those just mentioned In
and admini.3trators,

circumitanceo analogous

Under

the case of the executors

a receiver will be al.pointeri over

the property under the control of a trustee.
In

case of infants and lunatlcs :-

The court of chanof a

cery frequently Interfere by the appointment
elver to protect the estate of an infant.
SO also in

(2)

the cane of a lunatic when proceedings

have been commenced for the appointment of a cornlsslon.

(3)
A receiver may be

To secure the rents and profits:appointed over real property
and to secure

the rents and

for Its

better protection,

mrofits pendente

lite.(4)

In

the case of joint tenants and tenants in

common:-

In

rare instances equity will appoint a receiver over

Dodswell, 13 Voses Ch. 266"
v
(1) Mlddleton
36.
)ec.
v'torys Equity Jurisprudence.
II
61C-.
Blnn.
5
Kentoa,
of
a11atter
(2)
2zC.
Ch.
(c) Z,,tter of Vniorn, 5 Pai,'p
(4) High on Feeivers, Sec. 55G

P'ost

v

Door,

4

Ed.

Ch.

41;.

,1 F

claims

flictlni;
In.

of joint ten,rits,

this clamn

of csecs,

tenLnts in

or

cf ven,'or and purcth,.;( r :-

ce

a receiver in

corimon.

The court will

vrant

,r'e:rs

only i,,hen It

sumrary proceedinq;s are absolutely necenc;ry

that such

the rlihts

to irotect
In

tion grow i, , out of con-

t!''

l

property involved In

of both parties

the cause.

in

Here a receiver may be

Insolvency proceedings:-

a:p)olntvlq almost as a matter of course i-reepective of
the mture of the controveroy,
a receiver necsc-3ary
the litigating

vhenever

to fully protect

subject muitter over ;ihic,

it

the general ir~nciplec
must not be understood,

receiver

the rights of

partles.

Thus I have briefly enumerated

and

the court deems

1-; confined

the principl

a receiver may be ,I:polnted,
amrVlicable

to the

name; but

that the appointment of a

to these cases L-lone,

for the ap-

pointmrtent of a receiier 1 ", a matter restinc" entirely
vlithiln the soud 'tlocrtlion of the court,
always be governed by a consirderation

and will

of the

'rinciple,.

,16

already mentloner] and the
in

eacP ptirti ciur'1

tiec imi
hlcb are Involved

cta(.

VTno muy be tippointed.
The ,jeneral, cilmost tmiversvl,

rule reqnlreu

a receiver should be a disintere, ted party.
point, a party who is intererttei
subject mutter in

litic.atiorn,

to defeat the very objects,

in

To ap-

the property,

would,in

that

or

most cases

tend

for which a receiver shouli

be appointed.
A receiver
tegrity,

should be a percon of the highest In-

and of peculiar

lndependence of character.

He must be able to act vulth entire impartiallity and must
not be suoceptable to any advances

towards

favortisim.

Further he should be a perfnon of larg,,e and voried
busilnes

knovlerlge an.- experience.

knovwie<v,-(e and ability

reQuired varies with the n ,ture

of the subject matter,
appointed; but in

The amount of

all

over x> ic, the receiver i,, to be
eases it

should be sufficient to

17

enable hir

to transact the buliness

incumbeat upon him,

without the intervention of -, third party.
JA

party occupying a fiduciary relation,

or any

relation incemopatable with the chaiacter of a receiver,
will not be appointed.(1)

Thus it

and guardlans will not be f-ppointefl
or ftud under

their control.

io
over

that trustees
the property

An attorney in

the

cause hao been held to be absolutely riequalified
hold hi8 office.
Neither

to

(2)

should a party be appolted who hasi any

Interest, which in

any way conflicts with the interest

of the esntate or funrl in controversy; or who has at any
time been guilty of fraud, or mslocondurt in connection
with the oame.
It lo generally neceessary that the perron selected shoulJ be a res-ident of the state or jurisdiction
in which the action in

pending.

This rule,however.

has no applicatlon to a receiver appointed by a federal court.

(3)

(1) Sykeo v Hastings, 11 Veses Oh. 363.
13,7.
""
i"
(2) Catrland v Garland, 2
Byckman v Parkine, 5 Palges Ch. 548.
v Life Assn. of America, 13 Fed. Pep. 4[-%
(d) Taylor
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The_,e Erener-i l prnclplo.- may be ciome what modil1iu by the awjrecment of' all the ilartle8 coneerned,
but a clear departure from them7will
for, and

1e

rarely be sought

frequently granted.

Time of Appointment.
Under the former practice, both in thlrs country
and In Lfiflunu,
plicatlon

the court would not entertain an

for the apoIntment of a receiver until the

defendant had appeared and answered.

1But gret

Injuo-

tice and hardship often remulted from a otrict adherence
to this arbitrary rule; and court. of equity gradually

relaxed the former practice, and even made departures
from it, in case, of emrer)ency, where delay would recult In irreparable lo8

or great injustice to the

party seeking relief'. (1)
.It

ma,' now be re;ardel as the prevailing practice

for courts to appoint a receiver at any stage of the
proceedings after the filing of the bill,
(1)

Vlost v Swan, ( Ed. Gh. 420.
Clark v lidgley, '[ Md. Ch.

70.

upon 8uffic-

I1 9

lent cause being shoim.

A receiver may also be tip-

pointed ut the f'nol hearing or even after,
relief

sought Is

indlspensably neceo..;ucy for the pro-

tection of the partle8 in
Under
U'tlefled

Interest.(1)

the equity pietlce,

in

appointing a

has been commenced,

t

court will not be
unless an action

receiver,

save in

the exceptional

infants and lunatics previou8ly mentioned.
the rtutes

the time of appointment

ute; but little

where the

It

cases af
'In nome of

regulated by stat-

change from the old practice has taken

place.

.Lihnuer of ippointrnenl.

Bv motion for order of appointment:-

Such notion

should' be addressed to the court, and should be baced
upon affidavito showing the necessity
sought,
seeks

unless

the paper

on which

the relief are clreany on file

for the relief

the moving party
in

the casle.

(2)

Notice of thl, Totion should be served upon all

(1)
(2)

175.
Hills
v Moore,,15 Deaver
3f20.
v Cuching, 8 Wis.
Hungerford

neocefsary and Intee

ted partlec,

object of the tp!plicnti!on,
pupero,

if

and should c-tate

and upon

,h t pleadings andt

the motion v ill be fot'ided.

any,

Justify departure

(1)

To

from this established rule, requiring

notice of al.plication,

dering such sur'wivry
fully set forth.

the

the ft-cts and cir(atfrnstce ; renne es sary, must be

1)roceedin*s

(2)

Only In extreme cases

, where

the rlelaty whih would follow from H'ing notice would
be likely to result in a loss or diminution of the
property

to vxhich the receivership

Irreparable
dispensed

relates or where

injury would be sustained, will notice be
with.

Thus where the defendant has ab-

sconded, or is about to remove property from the state,
no notice ic necessary. ("-)

So if the defendant has

vol'Lntarily appeared, notice has held to have been
walved.

(4)

The affldavlts upon which the pltintiff
his motion should be clear and vunequivical,

baw ea
and not

mere general alle .ations or expressions of opinion.
(1) Tibbalos

(2)

Verplanck

v

Sargeant,

v

14

h.J.Eq.

erchntile Ins.

Co.

449.

2 Paiges Ch. 43l

(') High on Feceivers, Sec. 117.

(4)

GIbson v Martin, 6 Palges Ch. 471
McCarthy v Peake, 9 Abb. Pr. 164.

If

fraudI

is

alleged

the alle ed fruui

thct;e speclfIc acts conrtitutln ,

must be

(1)

,tto te1i-.

The object of notic,,e 1,i

to give

an opportunity to I)e heard In hl,

the (Iefendunt

lefenoe, and he may

appear at the hearing and preoent affidavit. Supportlng his pooltln,
motion.

and tending t.. mefe't the pDtintiff's

(2)

At the ti---e appointed,

the court hears

avit,- which have beew presented,

the affid-

and exa.inethe plead-

Ings which are On file In the casqe, If there be any,
und

from a conaellratlon of the evidence thus slubmitted

deterilne8the propriety of granting the application.
.If the motion be denied the plaintlff can only obtain
relief from

auch decree by presenting new affidavits

which constitute
court In
If

sufficient ground to justlfy the

sustalni'ig hi

the court grants

celver an order

the application

for his appointment

and should contain In
(1)
(2)

motion.

g-rleneral

Latham v Chafee, ,1
Edwards on Recelvers,

Fed.
6t.

for

a

re-

should be drawn up,

outline the prlncllal

!Lep.

52g.

powern and dutles whlleh arc- delegted to him,
ficierit discrIptlon of' the subject matter of
ership to enable the receiver

to readily

The order may also contain Inotructioas
managerae lt of' the trust
to Its

and a Ouftho

receiv-

identify It.(1)
in

regard

to t'o

property; but no directlons as

final disposition can properly be made until

rendition

the

of' the final decree.

The court may draw up this order,
one as submitted by the 'laintifft

or it

attorney,

may allow
or one,

the terms of' which have seen agreed upon by the partles
in

Interest.

(2)

The latter

be the most-equitable

one,

practice would sceem to

but under no circumetances,

will the court allow an order wh§ich contains provisions
that are contr,-ry to public policy.
As soon as the order Io secured It
tered with tie

clerk,

served upon all

and a copy of the

Interested parties.

should be en,arrie should be

(k')

The cou- t may ap)oint a suitable peroon to
as receiver or it

may refer

the matter

to a master In

-----------------------------------------------------(1)
(2)
(3)

Crow v Vlood, 1I3eavan
2 21.
WhItney v Belden,
4 Paiges Ch.
Edward on Receivers
61.

ct

139

chancery.
In
er' upon

case

the former

the court may name

the receiv-

and where this 13 done notice

the hearing-

of thie appointment should be served with the order,
and

iloo upon

or Itmay reserve

the party appointed

the appointment pending a settlement of the order by
the agreement of the

: artles.

(1)

The formier i'ew iork practice,
practice at the present
ate equity system,

Is

and tatke fror

in

states having a seper-

for the court to refer

of appointing a receiver
Thie court may empower

time,

and the prevailing

to a master in

the master

chancery.

to appoint a receiver

him the necessary security,

or Itmay

simply empower him to report to the court
one or more suitable persona
ln

the matter

to act

in

the names of

that capacity,

which case hl,-, selection murst be approved by the

court.

(2)
In

either case the master should be provided with

a certified copy of the order of reference.

(1) VanSant.

EQ.

Pr.

'ec.

(2) Barb. Ch. Pr. Vol. III,

465.
670.

Some

to be absolutely necessary.

authoritles hold this

The master unua-lly proceeds
ed partles

(1)

interest-

to bring the

Thin Is

together by means of' the- cumman.

simply a paper' in the form of' a notice, entitled In

the

cause and nigned by the master,

appointing# a time and

place for a hearing preliminary

to the selection of a

(2)

receiver.

Is

the summons

lecurel,

muster,

examination of any party summoned

the personal

If

In

of such attendance. (3)

the object

forth

oettinKf;

should be underwritten by the

case the defendant makes

a motion for an attachment may be made,

and if

the deallow the

(4)

At the hearing,

cuotomary for the master

is

it

receive written proposals
containing

appearlng,

the court will

feniant does not then appear,
atttachment to issue.

in

Iefault

to

from any interested person,

the name of the party whom they wish to act

as receiver.

If

the defendant does not appear ouch

proposals are usually confined

(1)

Quackenbush

(2)

barb.

v Leonard,

Ch. Pr. Vol.

Jee
i ve
on
Jil
,Jil
(4)
(4) Edward on Becelver8

II,

10
477.

6 .
U"
- z.

to the moving party.

Paigec Ch.

13.

In

the

:electiori

the ma oter should

of i receiver

exercise Oound discretion and appoint the person
he considero beat fited to fill

the pltice,

of party recomnmendation

solicltation.

or self

irrespective
(1)

Frequently more than one receiver ic
over

Whom

appointed

the same oubject matsr , but their Intere.-tsmuet

be such that they will
be done v,hen
the trust,

in

no way conflict.

the duties involved

in

Thi

may

the oerformance

would be no grt-at as to render it

of

Impractica-

ble for one person to attempt to perform them; or where
different courts have appointed

different

receivers

over

the same property.
When the master has selected a proper person to
act as receiver,

he should fix the amount of his bond,

and see that sufficient and proper surlties are given. (
The master should then make a report to the court,
stating the preceedings which have been taken and fhe
result obtained.
powered

(1)

(4)

If

the master has only been

to recommend come proper person

Lespinaose

v

Bell,

2

(C) Edward on Receivers,
-5.
Barb. Ch. Pr. C-17
(4) ,1

Jac.

& X.

em-

to the court to

436.

)

act be receiver, hle selection must be approved by the
court, and until such confirmation, the party appointed
cannot lolly enter into the performrnncc of
duties.

his

(1)

.If either party Is

disatisfied

with the masters

selection he cannot, except to it; but must make a special application to the court, that the master review
his decision. (2)

This application rosy be

made

either by petition or by motion, if by petition, the
petition should state the grounds of objection.
By an order

to show cause:-

This is

(U)

an exparte order

and ic granted upon motion by the plaintiff, and should
be served upon all interested parties.
fect notice to such parties
and place,

It is in ef-

to appear at a certain time

and show cause why receiver

should not be

appoin ted.
Upon the appearance

of the parties notified,

sub

-

stantially the same proceedings are taken as upon an
ordinary motion, cave that the burden is upon the defern.

-----------------------------------------------------(1) In the Mratter of the Eagle Iron 'orks,
(2)
(83)

Brower v Brower, 2 Ed. Oh. 21.
1oesec Oh. ClIVY;
Tihrape v Thrape, 12
In the Ivatter of the Eagle Iron V/ork:.

8 Palge Ch.
385.

suu)ra.

tint to ohow why a receiver
For

thli

Fhould not be appointed.

purpose he may offer affidavits,

rebutted by counter affidavite
plaintiff.

If

in

on the part of the

the defendant ohov,,

faction of the court,

which may be

to the eatle-

that the rights of the partlec

Interest can be fully protected1 without the appoint-

ment of a receiver; or that the appointment of a receiver will in

no way add to their security,

plication will be denied,
ed,

in

which case,

otherviise it

will be

The practice under the code.--

rhio io

(1)
in

many respects

that formerly prevallint; under

the old chan-

cery practice.

(2)

Indeed,

in

come respects,

almost ilentical.

01) See upon manner

of avijointment generally,

II, Barb. Ch. Pr. 308 - 318;
High on heceivers, 'C;ec. 62 - 118;

(2)

Edward on heceivero, ¢4 - 95;
73.
Beech on BeceiverrF, Sec. 7192;
v Chlieper, 5 Abb. Pr.
v:etter
614;
Beavan
11Hadley,
v
Robinson

Ireland

:rant-

the manner of hie appointment mill

be the came ac upon an ordinary motion.

similar to

the ap-

v

Nichols,

35 How.

222;

it

is

In ' eneral a receiver may be appolnt C at any
stage of' the i-roceedlng,,s,

but 'Jplication mu:t be made

by motion tit a specitl terra of the court.
ry,grant the order and wppoint

The court

t receiver tt

once,

or

it may refer the matter to a referee, who stands in the
came rel

tlon to the court as the master formerly did.

The rules governing the appointment of' recelvers,
e.-cept those which are specially provided for are laid
dovn in the code of civil precedure, (1)

and will be

found, upon careful examination, not to vary materially
from the old practice. (2)
Sections 178ti-

1789 provdde for the uppointment

of a receiver in an action to di.;colve a corporation
and are in effect but an extention of the former practice in

such cases.

Under the code a receiver appointed pendente lite
is called a temporary receiver till after judgment Is
rendered; and though exempt from many of the duties
(1) Section 1'13 - 1'16, Code Civil Pro.
(2) For full discussion of this subject and review of
authorities, see note in 19 Abb. N.C.
359;
2,e0 also article in 25 1.lb. Lai- Jour. 326;
, I,, I, viait's Practice, 202 - 272;
1"11 I, Vanmant hq. Pr.
8 Z4 - 409.

and

liabillt.i(es

to a strict

of' a permanent

receiver,

yet he is. held

by the court a!polntlng him,

ac-outability

for any departure from his prescribed powers

direct a judgment debtor

loo

The court, may

In much

which he may be the owner,
tunder

any property of

to the receiver,

to convey or deliver

and duties.

the old chancery system.

the same manner as

(1)

Securi ty.

This has

long been considered as one of the es-

senticil prerequisitere,
the performance

before a receiver

of his duties.

form of a bond or recogmizance,
ties,

for

the

It

usually in

with sufficient

faithful performances

hle amount of this

.Is

can enter upon
the

aure-

of' his duties.

bond valies with the nature and val-

ue of the subject matter of the receivership.
Formerly security must always be given,
in

ceses where

receiver,

(1)

themselves agreed upon a

the parties

and also agreed

Code of Civil Pro.

exeept

to dispense with the usual

Sec.

l

security.
receiver

lut In Nev, York the obllq~tioci

(1)

of H

ixe adequate security for the fuaihful per-

to

formance of his trust is

ref.;arded as being, founded upon

the , enertil practice of the courts of equity; and it
is

held to be within the power of the court to disis

pense with security, where it

plainly unecessary.(

2

even in

In seldom dispensed tivth,

Security,

iowvever,

New Zork,

the usual practice being for the court to

require at leqst two sufficient sureties.
Tre sur

ties are generally aTAproved by the court,

unless other provisions are made in
pointment,

the order of ap-

when they may be a pointed by the clerk of

the court out of ivhich the order isued.
upon being properly
clerk,

and u

til

executed

this is

The bond

should be filed veith the

done,

the receivers

title

authority does not vest.

------------------------------------------------------

(1) Mamners - Fruze, 11 Beaver, 80.
(2) High on Beceivere, Sec. 120.

and

U r A P

P 0

LIs

T LR I11I..

o F

A

Uenertil
Since a receiver
polinting him,

iniependent

and conrined

i,'ature
in

E.I I V E 1-.

of.

an officer

and a reprenontatlve

may eotublinh clairrm
powers

h h

In

the case,

of the court,

lriost exclusively

of the court ap-

of all
It

are

partien, whlo

follown

that h I

linited in

extent,

to such an are nece.n-

narily Implied by virtue of hln -,ponitlon, or are confered upon him by the courne and practice
Ac
receiver

court,

3

of the court;

to direet the performance of hic

and superintend the execution of the

follows ats aj matter of course,

vente

that

would be incorv)atable with the dignity of' the

to be obligel

ever:y act,
it

it
a i:eneral proponition, A may be Ocald,

can act only uider the anthorltY

but as it

of the court.

,ame,

that a recelver in

wit- :1 considerable amouit of discretion in

the

of hin minor dutler;.

dlnclharg;e
In
all

the

ende,-ivor

time'

a marier

as not tr

If

1oorl

prejudice

the righte

requi

he should apply to

hli,

In

of

at

the partles

whose

to

appointed my proceel

of the property

vLife

is

at

Co.

appointed.

Court.

once to

appointed,

'Y9 Nl.Y.

upon be-

take possession

-----------------------

Insc.

the

and cannot be

A receiver

over which he is)

the

even by the -i(ree-

to the

----------------------------

people

the order ap-

instance he was

tAke po;se..ion:-

the
to

relative

the pov.era

enlarged,

iithouTt Applicition

lig-ht

court for

his authorlty

brief,

or

rectricted

materially

the

court appointing hiam,

of the

authority

If

the proper

to

he should be careful not to exceed

lImilt.

prescribed

(1)

s ,uch

of any inter-

truqt are stated in

the execution of hil
pointIn-

(1)

Information.

ito

as

time doubt arlses

Lt any

to persue,

course

in'

and In

falth,

to :tct In

partle-.

estel

rent

he shoul'I ,,t

e,uhc dicretion

of

eXerclne

2b§t.

without

if

further order or leave of the coutrt,
ie

offered ,y

the party in

the party in

pos:se8sion.

possession reftaseo

to the receiver,

n% opposition
(1)

In

case

to convey the pro 'erty

the receiver rri' .

apply to the court

frr aa order compelling him to 4Io so.
In

iew York I t is

held that. tthe

title

receiver's

and right to possession vests back to the date of the
original

order for the appointment,

ceclings may riot be perfected

a later date; and

and right to possession dur-

title

that the receiver's

till

.ilthough the Pro-

ing the interval between su'h ori-inal order and the
ap-ointment,

time of perfectiniK >

are superior

to th

those of a judgment creditor wlho levies upon the property,

under his judg7ment during3 suc.]
In

no case is

the receiver authorized

force for any improper meann
the property.

In

interval. "

(2)

to use

to obtain possession of

some states an assIgnment

of' the

realt7 must be made to the receiver before his rig ht
of posseosion accrues;

(1)
(2)

(C)

(C)

but nearly all

Browning, 8 Pai.eo Ch. 888.
v
Parker
5 Abb. Pr. 42 t
Stur,.7c;,
Stute v
1 Barb. Oh. 592.;
filson,
v
illOo
2 Sanif. Ohi. "94.
Btorm v \fall,
Ohaut, unIua County ,ank v Paqley, 19

of the 8tute ,,

.Y.

C58.

he would be empowered to possnOs
soMimlty by virtue
His
n, oni

of' his

ponoesslon

of' the court,

turbed without
stated

by

(f

nor violence
d!rcharge

:

"nor vill

receiver

vindicate

Thin

power

, is

----

(1)

--

--

Luinh

v

a part

Puch
if

to

-"

c' v:ec

(

the

)

-ubject matter
Is

of

the trust

n---

Schenerhorn,

--

recourse

-'--

to the manaie-

re-rd
-

question.
A receiver

property:in

uricertin,

this

to determine

the court

to be taken

--

1 Clarkes Ch.

--

-)

.97,

-

iiloq o
v Allen, 6 Barb. b'2.
13
z PaI e E, Ch.
hoe v (ibson,
J3ruce v fL(. & K. l.E.Co. 19 Fed. lheD.
D)
avis v (ray, 16
l . (.
.
218.

--

--

and note.

.

(2)

the

need be pun-

of' the

the receiver

.If

some discretion
-

In

of the subject matter,

Mian8gement
likewise has

while in

force,

imprisonment or contempt. "(,

clearly

to the identity

should be had

to his,

the property 8ou!,ht

of the receivership.
as

ie).7

should be exercised with the utriost

and only when

-ponnoenuon of

the

to be di.turbP

authority and

"by fine,

thus

the court permit

pernon,

-

to be dip-

%hi8 rule Is

duties.
its

(1)

the posses

(2)

to be offered

isri the of'fender

becomes

consent.

of his offilil

court will

c-aution,

once obtlaed,

riot be permitted

its

the

of' appointment.

and will

Swayne J.

ponseosion

order

ilrmself of the per-

342.

-

ment of the property entruntel to hin care.

This

discretion In, limited almont excluoively to the minor
and le

,inij-or

tuit detn,)l-.in

dutien,; and arlsn
ject rmtter

the per f'.,rmance of' hin

either from the nature of the nub-

over whl:ii ho in

from the instructions

oppointed,

nevertheless

allowed,the receiver

amenable to the court for its

exercise; and unleno he employs a reanornable
businenn

care and diligence,

responsible

implied

of the court.

Tlhough thin d_ax tion in
is

or Is

proper
amount of

the court will hold him

for any lo88 of the trunt funds whi<oh may

result.
A receiver may make such repairs of' the property
under his control as are absolutely necensary for it-;
preservation; but the courto

!coks with 8usplction up-

on any expendlturen for thin purpose,

and if

any ques-

tion arineo an to their necenoitY or propriety,
court may refer
ga ti on.

the matter

the

to a master for Investi-

the exceytlons

-itx

tle

conatrol

over

queotlonc

to

a

the tru,- t proerty,

of

of his
the

noted,

reoeiver hu-

the party,

trust,

ard whenever

,

It

would be a gro

for him to act without

help:-

to carry out the

of' the court.

he will

expenec?

whichl

perform,

that

P ut

(1)

nececary,

he has

incurred

whilch he,

but he i
of either

in

litigation.
Protecting

of a

himself, might have done.

prohlbited

(1) Taylor

(2)

when

employing

or defendant

the
in

the

to any of the partle

(3)

to take all

property:proper means

property uinder hiq control,
any re,.1onaole

counsel,

fron

the plaintiff

the trust

receiver

inotructiono

employing held to

when he inP acting adversely

the

1-oplication

not be tllowed any

A receiver may employ suitable

in

.nc vio-

A receiver may employ ouch

help as may be necessary

cane,

effect

court.
hploylng

attorney

lit-

arlge whose decilnion would materially

the interest
lation

juit

conduct

and

It

Is

the duty

to protect

the court will

on the part

of the

the
nustln

receiver,

v

Sweet, 40 1v1i6-A. 7 36.
504.
4C5 Uow. Pr.
Long,
v
(2) Carey
54k;
Ch.
Palges
5
Parkino,
v
Byck
(a)
Tbhe m-atter of Rob. Ainsley, Receiver

1 Ed.

Ch.E76

whicl

it

ThiAs 1
in

deems necessuiry
evpeclally

to

true in

tccomplih
cact,

thin end.

where the property

threatened withn sudden dentruction,

delay incurred
sult

in

b'.

serious

As emergencle8

auiplication

or where

the

to the court would re-

loss or diminution of' the trust

estite

of this kind do not frequently ariee.,

a receiver will seldom be culled upon
express

(1)

to act without

authority from the court.

Under

the Direction cf the Court.

1his class

embraces

oe exercised uadler

thone powers which can only

the lrimediate aupervislon and con-

trol of the court.

From the nature of a receivers

position and his Intimate relation

to the court,

it

will be rea dly
een , that this claso of Dowers must
be the most extensive and important which he is called
upon

to perform.
Continuing business :-

instructions

from the court,

(1)

v

Iddings

hruen,

4

In

absence of express

a receiver h-i

Sandf.

Ch.

41z.

no author-

ity to continue the buslnene of the party or corporation over whoio Tro!ierty he hun, been NI.T)oint d.
primary object
not to embu-irk
only be

f'or Wilch a receIver
la bu-inenc

tllov,ed when it

beet interests

et

in

rise; and thin will

will be ,,ubnervlent to the bet.

Examples of thln) occur most frequentl,,i
corporations and partner,hip.

in

(1)

the case of

And a receiver hao been

to continue such busineco,

will allow him considerable
of the name.

,ppoirlted 18

of those beneficially entitled.

duly authorized

The

latitude in

the management

provide,1 no radical dparture

customary method of conducting

a court wi 1

the business

from the
is

at-

temp ted.
Receivers are often
uqement of extended

iven

the control and man-

lines of railroad; and when thns

-,ppointe- often carry on for a considerable tlme very
extensive business operations, employing) a large number of pervant.n,

and performing for the public greneral-

ly all the functions of' a common carrier.

(1) Jackson

v

Deforest,

14

How. Pr.

F31.

So,

in

the case of par tnersihius),,
by the court,

when It

is

deemed e:.:pedient

thnt te business of the concern be con-

tinued., receivers are often entrusted wit-. its contrel.
Dut In

these cases,

as in others 6f a similar nature,

the source of their power is

the court itself,

and

they still remain accountable to it for the faithful
dicharg<e of their dutles.
Making sales:-

A receiver has no power to dil-

pose of any portion of the T)ropierty or fund under his
control,

without thae consent of the court expressed

or Implied.

,3uchl power is

usually conferred upon t1

the receiver by direct order of the court, but it
ari e by implicatlon ; an vhere

J receiver 1

may

-pPointed

over prCperty of a perishable nature,

or where he is

empowered to engt-ge in some business,

the successful

prnocutlon of' which, reQuires the purchase and sale
of' conmmodities which form a part of the subject matter

of the recelverhip.
A receiver will ordinarily be illowed to sell

personilty and collect such outstUinding reoot8, nt-i ,re
necesnsry to a final dispoltion
Out exprens

diroectiori

of the property,

of the court.

receiver has been authorized
give 'i 'eed

of the anme,

come absolute

till

ratified

(1)

Vihen a

to sell re,',lty,

but such der

vwitiw-

io-

by the court.

he may
not be-

(2)

Frequently
made by

the court refaseo
to ratify
a sale
. receiver, when it a)pears tht
the co8ider-

--tion r-2celved is

gro ssly inadeimqute,

are circumstances ;hic,
or improper conduct in
purchaser

takes the

raiae

connection with the n'tle.

the power

to this

to, "impair

The

implied

of rescisslon ;hich

may be exorcised by the court cannot be said in
way

there

presumption of fraud

oroperty subject

condition; and hence,

or where

the obllg ttion of contract.

"

any

(3)

1 receiver han no power to purchase ot bin own
sle,

In

ulations

absence of strLtutory provieions,unless
to that effrct

ected parties.

(41)

are agreed upon by the interIf

-------------------------(1)

Rockwell

v

stip-

Merwin,

the receiver

procures

the sab

-------------------------

8 AI b.

Pr.

(N.S)

380.

(U.,F. ) 16.
(2) Krontz v N\1orthern Dank, 16 vwi.
(8) vandervelt v Peceiver Little, 48 JS.J.Eq. 66..
.
E
0 fr.Lo.
Y Anderson,
(4) rnderson

sale

by fraud

would

lie

to

or

Impositlon upon the

net ncide

the sale,

might be had upon motion before
him.

to allow a

receiver

Ing

trust

to the

and only in

canen

faith,

for

and
wfill

enforced,

and will
and will

and

be

reluctant

consent,
when

of those ultimately
the receivear

(2)

such ex-

are made in

rood
entitl-

to be reimburs-

(3)
long recognized and strictly

receiver who Jlnre

the

and

without its

amount,

rule has been

peril,

tesult,

in

the benefit

outlays.

ThiR

very

to expend any of' the funds belon'-

the court allow

for Bucl

is

of absolute necens-lty,

-,re nmall

his

thou;h relief

the court appointing

The c,,urt

property,

penditures

ed

even

an action

(1
Paying out money:-

ed,

court,

be

liable

subject

ar-t

It

acts at

lose whiMh may

for any

to removal at

the pleasure

of' the court.
of serious

Nothing would be more productive
than

sults,

for

the

court to allow a

receiver

free

redie-

---------------------------------------------------(1) LHackley
(2)

II

(a)

Condry

v

Story's

v

Draper, 60 1K. . 868.
Eq. Jurleprulence,
66C

l.] .Co.

9C ,U..

CG52.

a.

posltion of the
If

at

trmnt fuidc.

any

money

to meet

apply

to

time It

becomes necencs'ry

legitimate

the court

,

expenses,

for

leave

to pay out

the receiver

to do oo.

(1)

should

Sueh ap-

Dllcatlon should be maide in the form of 'J petition
and nhouli or-lnarilly be in writing, and should contAn a -tatement of the amount to be expended,
specific object

therefore, and

the nae or names of

the partyor partie,;

to whom oucUl mone;_

to be

The court will irant

felivered.

ion whenever, In

the.

the exerclse of Its

or property io
a DetItpueh

-liscretion, it

deems such expe-di ture necem-ary and proper.

lrlngin" Ond dei(n¢1irl
runc(

actlone:-

In the ier2foi-

of his varied duties, a recovet is

often called

upon to brinc; or Cefend an 8ction In reltntlon

to the

subject r-v'tter

urpose
D

CA

his

charg,;e.

11eeivcr occupies ci-beitatially
].hIvm

or

-un'ler

oCcupied] by the oriFinal

over vvhose

v

(1)

liooper

(2)

High on Fee

estate

For
the

rF,

24 .Ill.
ec. 205.

ame

to,;]tion

party, avainet whom

he vwas appointed.

Kinston,

tIi

454.

(2)

1iut o1nte,
t 1fl) o~ IilnK

+

n;t,ei

he in

JllT),

in n ,el ther n,

a recclx'(,r

lv
it

t~oweJ1 cccto

or in cQul ty,

of the recoixeCi hip,

from the court.

(1)

conferred upon

him,

and Prove

lIn.

Ifs tin offic er of the

in

rltj tute
t

,ouLrt

)roceed -

re-tird to the rub-

,ithou.t eT:rc, uuthoil1,,

',hon -uch uutitc,rIt;,! hiao been
he mru,-t

et fortt

in

Tib;

th-,t he u, c duly acppoin ted

tplead-

recci ver,

aviLcttc', uLnder the direction cf t,e court,. (2)
Ac to whe:hcr a receiver should F;cue in hi-: own
nume, or in

the name of the or!Cint-i1 party In whose

favor the action accrued,

depend;

tion in which ouch action wuvi
Loulnidana,

Tennoceee,

Srecelvr mt,,
vanlaj,

cue in hic o

Indiana, .Ii1nols,

In hiew York tnd

brought.

(1)

,:i.i, i and Vilencln,

the rame of the original T'xIty.
oome of the other

to t"e positiEon whilch a r(civer

Storye Eq.

lT "me,

ir'ri
re; but in Penn.qyl-

que,5tion hoc been -ettled by legiclatlon.
Ovin'

In Nlew York,

iNewm Jer'ey, CTeorgia and

cult must be brought in
(C)

upon the jurlndic-

Jurldl rurlence,

tate

this

(4)
ocCupIes,

'ec. 8[, a,
MYerri tt
v Lyon,
16 WVend.
Z 10.
(2) Daytl:
v Connah,
16, LioHo.
Pr.
,26.
) iigh on t-eceixers,
Sec. 20C - 10, & cases CIted.
(4h Nathan v "-ihitlock,
- Pai eo Ch.
I52.

it

follows

or li

theft any defensc

1 1m) ty,

brog
iht

up by the

equ Ily avn 1llab le, when nu !t If r

I

by n recr

TIbleb may be ,ot

vyor.

Upon the trial

the unun Ipract! ce and proc(Aludre

obtiins and no thing further need be F ta ted upon thin
subject in

this connection.

Vihen an action is
a receiver,

an entirely

s.ought to be cor.,enced
different

As a general rule,

Cd.

without t>'e consent of' the
TThe

in

question

agannst

1i; present-

a receiver cannet be cued
court auAolnting him.

courts are unanlmouoly agreed upon thin proposItio-A
cace of an atterapt made to Interfere -ith

tual possession
holds ; but ac

of the property,

the ac-

:whlch a receiver

to vhethei an independent action at lav,,

may be malntaine'i

against a receiver,

to enforce a

liability vhlch he has Incirred by reason of
duct,

or by virtue of -is

erty,

is

is,

con-

relation to the trust prop-

( question v,hIch has caused much discusoon,

and upon winjh the courts are not entirely In harmony.
- ----------------------------------------------------

ribe

g:;encr:)]ly

prevnil1ing

opinion,

hovever,

neems

that

the prosecutIn!g" party muta;t f'ir:at obtain

sent

of tie

S.
Jomrnal,
been

court.

D.

declded

contrary

aypointing, him and

to be

Sue another;

a

in

ito

of the court

such con be sued

court

that one co-ordinate
leide1

v

"

coneequencer

Sampson,

14 How.

-arton v l3arbolur, 104 U.S.
8
0 f.L.
Jonec v 1ro3n,

(U.S.)

Pa. St. If;

65;

;

544;
Va.
-6
Larbour,
v
le1endy
Contra :68;
Ia.
42
Central P.R. of 0.
v
Allen
h;
s
i.
18
Crooker,
v
{inrn%,
Apparantly contra :C8 Vt.. 408;
Brainerd,
v
tlumenthal
10 Ct.
167, (s.c.
59 -Vt.
F.R.CO.
v
Lyman
Page
v
Smi th.
99 1......
o96,

Hill

v

Parker,

il1

mass.

can

proposition

D35
Smi th, 9 Vesee Ch.
v
( 1)n!el
106;
Abb. Pr.
14
l@!aldwin,
v
Taylor
i.Co.66
Atlantic U boetern
v
lhobincon

,ionall

in

ovrn court,

the consent of hisn

doctrine absurd as a

mischlevous
l

de-

sild:, "'li

arY,

the

to admit that

to admit

cane v-hich had

the might of authority.

sald

18 virtually

an

rule,

to this

without

court,

of the Uentrtil 1Iv;

upon an .Iowa

L!aInt

A receiver hasn been

another

edltoei

Thompson,

clearly

ia

cl1on

the con-

(1)

comnenting

In

to be,

508.

&46);

The proper procedure In such canert voulrl seem
to be,
for

for

grievd

the

letve to sue te

for an order
(1)

receiver,

the court

or to make I motion

of the court grant1ng the rellef

The court is

action

ptirty to petiti(i

exceedingly adverse

to allov; 8n

to be brought against Its receiver,

usutally grant the relief'
vwhenevc;r

ought.

sought by means

ar

It

will

of an order

the sotme results can be. obta ined,

and thus

obvitite the necer;sity of' bringing an action.

Extra

Territorial

As a general

proposition,

Powers.

the

jurisdiction of a

receiver

is

ing him,

but there are some well recogniz :d exceptions

concurrent w;ith that of the court

to this genleral
is

For exanple: vvhere a receiver

rule.

aTppointed over a corporation, which has been created

by the combined

legislation of several

v,iiose property extends into different
and connic;ts,

(1)

tcnpolnt-

as

the caoe

hitney,

Rigge
Wlsiwall

in

v

Sampson,

15 Abb.
14

ntates

jurisdictions

of rbilrobds,

Pr.

and

of one

386;

-How. (U.S.)

65.

a receivcr tippointed

indlvi.tilble w.hole,

may exercise

diction

) and

doi-in in
cases

the contrtiry
federal

the

can be

not

oritles,

after

embodying

concluded

were sustained by
1. ,

11

that

the

former
wasU

of the judgment
It

was.

an exaustive discussion of
a careful

review of' the auth-

the followving

proposltlons

the weight of authority:

jurisdictlon

2., "Property within

the

per se and

ceiver

that In

line of e,asr-n

y court may appoint a

withcuLt its

laid

Tlhe only way these

to hold

1

the latter

vihile in

question

likeulse been

(')

courts.

to the creditors

Profeocor Hamllton,
this

(1)

the exercise of ouch jurldlotlon

detrimenttl

debtor,

doctrine has

reconcile(]

of cases,

line

line.

the entire

over

repudltited by some of the stttes,

Is

Put thle doctrine
(

control

one jurlo-

in

receiver,

over property

as well as within.
jurisdiction

passes

to a re-

the receiver may ass:ert his

----------------------------------------------------Earb. 585;
St John, 29
1;
107 Mass.
B.& C.P.F.Co.
v
1oods 416.
& Ral. Co. 2
V Atlantic,
.AlrT eT
290.
e.
5
Colvumbian,.Ins. Co.
v
(2) aunt
272.
1Y How. (U.S.)
Clark,
v
(Ci) Both
%,.J.L. 1.
City of Elizabeth, 41
v
(4) Hurd

(1)

F-nk
Lllei

v

)

right against any court.
S.,"Property out(:Ide of the jurisdiction pastles by the
appointment per 0o
privles,

as afainot the debtor- and hip

but not a, ,illnt

creditors of the debtor,

residing in

the foreign jurisdiction, where

property Is

situated,

elm juriEdlctlon
own creditors
is

within

lll

and the courts of such forprotect the rfights of their

to the property of' the debtor,

this jurisdiction,

appointed by another

the

theft

ac against a receiver

court.

4.,:'here the receiver has once obtuined rightful possession of the property, he was appointed to take
charge of, he will not be deprived of its posseosion, even thoueh he remove with it to a forelgn
jurisdiction, " (1)
The doctrine just enunciated rests solely upon
the comity of the courts, and subject to the modifications previously mentioned, receivers are usually
allowed, throubgh courtesy to exercise the ca-me poviere
-------------------------------------------------

(1)

Akrticle in 2 2

iwI.

Law hog.

(E.S. ) 289.

in

a foreign jurio;dictlon

q; in

Stuitutory

their ovm.

Poverc).

The law of receivers han undor gone a romarkable
developement during the list
In

two or three decades.

many of the states statute, have been enacteri, who

objects have been to more accurately determine and fix:
the varledpovero

and llabilitles

of a receiver.

result of this le!ilation
have in

-As a

the powere of receivers

many cases been gretitly enlarged and extended.

Nothing has contributed more to produce thin result,
than the rapid growth of mCdern corooraite entervrlne,
and the attempt of legislators

adapted

appropriate lei8lation,

which have constantly arises in
It

is9 not, however,

cuss the ltiv
11 -vlll

arplicable

simply refer

this csubject,

to meet such growth by

a

to new exegencies
this branc-.

of the law.

part of my theme to dle-

to statutory receiv.ers,

the student who Is

and

interested in

to time sta.tute of' hi( own state.

C H

L I A I

,P T

I L I TI

0 F

;

To
1Y virtue

i_ I

1-

E C E I V L I.

Court.

the

of the relation

cuplesit follows

I/.

logically,

which a

receiver

oc-

that he is at all times

am(- rmble to the court which hap appointed him, for
the

faithful

To hold otherwisc

ee.

court its
its

performance

elf;

for

ovm officers

under

like

be recreant

the same

the puryooe

engaged

we

only so

Under

these

in

upon

the

liabilitieo,

which others

are made

to bear would indeed

find

that

far as is

for which he wat

he is

to reflect

the discharge of its

Aucordlngly.
by t1he court,

ould be

that court vho does not impos e upon

circ-vLstances
in

of the duties which he aoum-

the

lawful

circiunstances,

duty.

tA receiver
neceocgry

appointed,
performance

if' loss

is

protecte4

to subserve

and only when
of his dutic

occurs without any

faulit on the Part of the recelver, the court will not
requlre him to make ruch loo irood. (1)
But if

the receiver

II tctln,, beyond the ncope

auithority,

or derrogation of come ex-

of hic Implle,1

of the court,

prero Intruction

or depreelation

ble for any los

he will be held liaof the fluid entrustel

care, though ouch 10cr war vholly unexpected

to hi-

and not likely

to have haimpened from the'course pUr-

cued, and although the conduct of the receiver, war entirely free from Improper motivec.

(2)

hecelvers are to a certain extent goveri-ed by
the camrne ruler of conduct and subject to the
bilities as
(C)

lation.
vwith

,-rtie lla-

trusteec and others In 'a fiduclary reThey should never mingle the trust funds

dieIr omin, nor use or Invest them for their own

benefit.

(4)

If

they do,

they become

profito which may accrue from the rome,

liable for any
and in

cane

they suffer the truut funds to be mingled with their
own,

the burden is upon them

to show what part of the

---------------------------------------------------(1) Union Lank Care, 32 N.J.hQ. 4C.
(c)
(Z-)

,
?.
M
N)
atter of Staford, 11 Barb.
.11j, 13-6.
Vol.
Jurisprulence.
Eq.
Pomeroys
,:f the (fuardien Saving Institution
78 N.Y. 408.

fundo thus blended belongs8 to thern, and the remainder
will be rem rledcln belonging to the enstate.
J,.Receive- must t-,t certain

periods,

and whenever

(1)

Bttited or re.7uliir

c.lled upon by the court,

ren-

der a full and satisfactory statement of hie various
receipts and expenditures, in connection
erty under his control.

(2.)

;Ith the prop-

The court will never al-

low this; report which is technically called an accountIng) to be divpensed with.

And in nearly every case

of thin kind, where a receiver unreisoably delays to
submit his report, the court matC,

in the exercise of'

Its discretion, require him to pay interest upon any
balance,

which remains in his hands, from the time

when such reoueot was made until hie accou nting 1s
finally rendered.
It
pas

is, customary for

upon the various

the court to examine and

items contained In

a receivere

report; and until finally ap!.roved by the court, a
receiver i

personally liable for any unauthorized ex-

---------------------------------------------------v
(I) Utica Ins. Co.
(2) Kerr on heceivern,

Lynch, 1. Paigles Ch.
238.

520.

pendilture which he has made.
cau:ew

in

which

8

Further specific

receiver Will become personally

ble to the court appolntlng him,
since In

moot cti'-em

lia-

need not be g~ven,

this can be determined by an ap-

plication of' the teneral

Iirno1pl-e

already staited.

-io third Parties.

In

genernl:-

A receiver

if

sible to the court appointing hir',

not only responbut lie In also

responsible to third parties whom his conduct effects,
for the proper discharge of his duties.
Indeed, the
primary object which impels the court to no readily
take coqnizance of ever act of misconduct on the part
of a receiver,

is

to ,-rotect the rights and interests

of the parties whom he ie
Though this
upon every breac,

liability
of trust

appointed

tc third parties accrues
effectln ; their rlg*hts,

conOent of the court must ordinarily
fore it

can be enforced.

to represent.

the

be obtained be-

The court Itself may take

cognizane
it,

o1

or perkit the Lgvrei

'Whaen

the

linbl 11 ty and r-c;I ermine

the renreiver,

relief

eought

If;

party to

Yd

clearly

tion of'. the court of equity
tice

is

to see]k

is

method

the

muc,-! more

A receiver

ali

to grant,

of

t-e

not,

for acts performed! in

but !--e

.ill

not be allowed

screen,

ori ty,

or

in

Contracts:er without
plied,

A contract

does not bind

02)

Biut if

to

to the lnt,:rested

in

ratify

from personal liability.

pr .r.ahic

be held per;onally

official

capacity,

the scope of hiq

entered

and

and

auth-

into by a

exvreoed

receiv-

or imu-

the receiver

be-

the perfoanmce of the

the contract

it,

the better

equally expeditious.

the court,

ly beneficial
moot cases

jurisdlc-

trust.

the estate,

liable

01)

to shield himself' behind

of his

the consentof

comes individually
same.

his

when acting beyond
viclation

law.

court by petition.

howoevr,

liable

this

wilthlu the

e'onomical and

v ill

sue at

shoul(

F,

be manifest-

parties,
thus releive

the
tie

(3)

(1) Klien
v
Jewett, 26 N.J.]Eq. 476;
See canes cited,
supra, page 45 & 46.
(2) 2Ryan v Pand,
20
Abb. N.C.
31.
(3) Krontz
v
Northern Bank, 16 -Iall. 16.

court will
receiver

In b-ome of' the

tbtes it

has been heir

that a

receiver will no,*, 'e T)ound by the contriecs of hie prr4ecessor; (1)

but in ro t

attr

this

ques ton Ir ,et-

tle'i by the court, by incorporttlng Into the a rrjer appointing a nei,, iecelver,thc. tcrrms uon

Mwhici he Is

to

as;ur:,e control of the buires.
receiver cannot. contract so ur to bind the
party or corrioration,
poInted.

It

over v.-ose prouerty he vas au-

usually hapens,

dlschar! e of the receiver,
part.

corporatic'n

0-

court prescrIbe8

however,

tlhtat upn

the

and the restoration to the

of' their property,

tat

"

the

conditions upon vnhich the proPerty

may be taken back; and usually the part', or .Cporatim.
is

required

relation

to aosmne and

carry out ouch contracts

to the pToperty as

of the court entered into,"
a imrty ii induced

If

relYIng upon the perr.n,l
the recelver v ill

not

the receiver boe.

in

by order

(2)
to enter into a contract,

liability of the receiver,

there &fter be all med

to show

------- -- ---- ---------- ---------------------------.J.
(1) Lehigh Coal & Na'. Co.v (en. R.R.Co. of
41

L~J. ti2.j

odifiee

(2) Chas.

iSV;

in Vanderbel;

Flske Bea'h Jr.

v
in

Little,
letter

.6

10 Cent. >ep.

to writter.

thn t he was contraCtlUK in

wal

tract, aince it

official

of the con-

his duty to .ntate In what capacity

at the time the contrant was made.

he contracted,

Where the conduct of' a receiver has be

Torts:-

cane,

able, whetier

be

doeO

dictil,

somewft' t questionthis

and the weight of autihority seems to

would not.

it

is

equity would have jurlollctlon In

of cases,
that

It

rtnmedy at law,

once to his

to report at

Injured party

allow the

but will

ci-c

rarely take cognizanee of the

All

of equity

tort,

In

be n such ao to make him liable to an action
courtos

but

capacity,

performance

th

for

be responslble

will

is

it

exist,

has

seldom,

if

jurlo-

this

if'

Certainly

(1)

ever,

ex-

been

ercined.
From
Is

to peculiar

subject

courts have
ceiver who

a

ti-e moment of his .- rointment,

far as

takes peeeesson

cluded within1

hIS

truet

The Felerl

liabilities.

even gone so

to hold

that a re-

of T)roperty WIhlic

will

receiver

be liable

is

to an action

----------------------------------------------------(1)

v
Wabac> FiR..o.
Jewett,
v
PlayS

1 .rown,
19 _m.

Brad.
5
Law heg.

not in-

(Ill.

App. ) 590;
& note.

of, trenpasno-,

though actIri

in

perfect good faylt-

and

with te lnt entloni of carryini-, out the Intructlon8
A receivei

of the court. (1)
neiligence

on hin part, whiJc

ution of' the trunt propeity,

i.

will be liable for any

caunen ar.

loon or dinin-

or reult8

in

offlnially

liable for

pernonal

in-

jury. (2)
fhether a receiver in
negli.geLce of' Mln employees,

importance.

Thi-

affirmative
this

Jer!-ey,

Iowa,

In

and

In a riuer-tiori of great

question has been decided in the

a; a very largc

couiitry.

the

Ohio,

majority of the courts

]Ne-vv Hampshire,

aesachueetto,and

every state where tle
held that a receiver

of

Vermont, New

Indeed in nearly

queotloti han arinen it h'.

been

occupiea the same position which

the party or corporation v;hose property has been cofiflocated formerly did,
are riot entitled

and tis ieint,- the case,

to tny immunitieo

they

from the ordinary

liabilities of' persons conducting such business, and
are conoequently liible to the same extent that te

---------------------------------------------------(1) Gurran
(2) Kaiser

v
v

Craig, 22 Fed. Rep. 17).
21
Ia. .5.
K'eller,

orlI7inl party or corporntor

would have been.

Though this

Is

li1,e

of' reanoning

;,ound

in

(1)

principle,

the
clearly sustained by weight of authority,
courts of New York have allowed theinelves to be unand In

wittinrly
In

led into an :~pp arently contrary

Cardot

v

(2)

Barney,

profession no little

acase which has caune]

amount of trouble,

say:, "A receiver who Ltcts in
ao an officer

Jcctrine.
the

the court

no other capacity than

of the court is not liable for an action

of negligence causing

the driath of a

no personal neglect is
oelectIon of agents,
Tha't the court,

in

passeng er,

imputed to him,

or in

either

the performance

in

where
the

of any duty

,deciding this case, intended to

hold that the trust funds or corporate property could
not be re.-nched through the -.,edlum
applied

of a receiver,

and

to the liquidation of just claims growing out

of the ne.gligence of' a receiver's
evident; but this seems

to be the conclusion of' courts

v Holbrook,

(1) Mer d odminlntratoro
XlIen

V

Jewett,

employeea is not so

26 -N.J.Eq. 474;

53;
R.R.Co. v Davis, 25 Ind.
9,3 Vt.
v Brainerd,
mrentha]
Pag1e Smith,
99 Mass.
395;
Purs
v 1.T. Co. ,
(2) 63 iN.Y. 281.

20 O.St. 187;

34

Fed.

Rep.

402;
24-.

Hl,,r
Ii
in his

text book writter igenerally.

and

standard work on

makes

in commenting upoa

(1)

barney,and an earlier New York case, (2)

v

Cardot

receiverc,

the entirely too broad, and come xThat mlslead'In view of' these decislono,

that

in.,g statement,

there

would oseem to be absolutely no remedy in New fork to
loss or

one 8ustainlng

damage through the operation of

a railroad by a receiver,"
v

Kain,

(3)

lhe regards
doctrine

Iater he refers

and an other more recent case,

in

(4) which

Cardot v Barney.

the contrary, regards Smith

Mr beach, on

the

changing

as modifing but not materially

promulgated

to Smith

v

Kain

For
v barney.
as sractlcally overruling Cardot
myself, I must confess that I do not ceo that Smith

v

Kaln dirq!1-,yl

overrules Cardot

real point decided in Smith
\"that if a receiver

v

v

Barney.

Kain would seem to be:

leases and operates a road over

which he hao not been ap!ointed he becomes
even

though

The

the court consent

to

liable

ils so doing.

-----------------------------------------------(1) HIlgh on heceivero, Sec. 095, o.
N.f. 61.
58
(2 ) Dentz v R.TR.CO.
(
80
B3)N.Y.
456.
60U.
NJ.Y.
Erie R.R.Oo. (
v
Woodruf'f
(4)

True

there is

ly showing
in

Cardot

any amotunt of dicta

the disapprovl
v

Barney,

In

thic case,

clear-

of the court to the ruling

ani a

tendency of the court to

break awuy from their

former position; and there can

be but little

thmt if

fairly

this questlon

ca-me

before the courts of this state,,"Nevi York

would be in
upon

doubt

line with other

this quention:
The liability

the termination

"

cIvilized coymunities

(1)
of a receiver

of the suit,

does not cease wtla

pending which he was ap-

pointed,

but coritinuee

court.

After his discharge a receiver

tilhli

final discharge bj the
cannot be made

personally liable for any acts done in his official
capacity

or otherwiseif they have been ratifled by

the court.
Peither will

the party or corporation

over whone

property a re,:eiver was appointed be subject to the
liabilities
unleos

which he has incurred during his office,
they

expressly agree to assume them.

(2)

eo. 481.
v ',alker, 55
[1) £mt ee tenderson
(2) Davis
v Duncan, 19 Fed. rep. 47;
mentz v Buffalo
.Y-.Co.,
58 N.Y.
61;
5022;
v
Stringfellow, 44 Ark.
tR. -. Co.
Bell
v
Indianapolis R..Co., 53
Ind. 57;
Contra:
Sandford v People,
Ill.15
558.

The rule upon thie once sorne w-h t doubtfual proposltion
is

thus stated by ,r. 13ePch:. "It

rule In

was formerly the

Jdlfchar!,Ing the receiver of, a railway,

pose upon the corporation,

to im-

liability for the torts

of the reoelver and his employees, but, cmrnmenclnF,
with the Vlabash case, a different

rule hao obtained,

and now no intelligent counoel would all,:vT an order
to be enterei impoolnip that liability upon the cornpany
The theory upon

,hinh the more m:
odern doct-l!ne rest

Is thie: there is no privity whatever between the person injured by the receiver's tort and the corporation,
and there Is therefore, no rea:.;on why the corporation
should be made liable,"
If a receiver lncurs personal liabilities whic-_
he is unable to meet, the Injured party may proceed
a-iinnt his

,uroties wio are liable for his leftiult to

an amount eual to that speclfled In the receivern
bond.

In thls event the nurety is entitled to be

reerabursed as far as may be out of any balance due the

receiver

from the em-ntate,

ac determined

by the receiv-

or's accounting.
hus we ' ee that, Ta recejver's position does not
awval him as a defenrse,

when he has been

,uitty

act whici would ordinarily make him amenable

of any
to the

injured party were he acting;- Inlependently of' the cou-t,
Even this brief .3tudy of' the law of receivers
is

sufficient

to impress the careful otudent with the

fact

that the positlo

with

;reat responsibility, and calls for

of a receiver

of the greu test amount of business
In

the dischare of his dutlep,

is

temp ta tions whi c:,

Integrity and independeiice
Tihe interests whlch he is
various and conflicting,
yet he should under all
repres entatlve

of all

will

the exercise

skill and fidelit-y.

a receiver will often

encounter many obstacles and be subject
peculiar

one fraught

to rany and

require the hli hest

of character

to overcome.

appointed to repre.',ent are
and often involved In

circumstances

doubt;

be the equal

interested partles: through all

the

conflict

and f;trife

main Impartial

clamantB,
that

and

of lltlitlon,

mreffected

b

worklng with one great

,

he should re-

the

object in

to prove hlmeelf worthy of hi.

finl

advance of rival

trulnt.

viewA

and

